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ABSTRACT
Emerging programmable dataplanes will revamp communi-
cation networks, allowing programmers to reconfigure and
tailor switches towards their need, in a protocol-independent
manner. While the community has articulated well the ben-
efits of such network architectures in terms of flexibility
and performance, little is known today about the security
implications. We in this position paper argue that the pro-
grammable dataplanes in general and P4 in particular in-
troduce an uncharted security landscape. In particular, we
find that while some existing security studies on traditional
OpenFlow-based networks still apply, P4 comes with several
specific components and aspects which change the attack
surface and introduce new challenges. We highlight several
examples and provide a first systematic security analysis.
1 INTRODUCTION
By outsourcing and consolidating the control over network
devices to a logically centralized controller and by intro-
ducing open interfaces, Software-Defined Networks (SDNs)
in general and OpenFlow in particular have enabled great
flexibility in how modern communication networks can be
managed and operated. However, while OpenFlow is a use-
ful standard in that it allows to control switches from many
different vendors in a unified manner, it is still “fixed” as
it relies on the assumption that switches have a fixed well-
known behavior, as described in the data sheet of the switch
ASIC; moreover, the growing support for protocols combined
with the fact that OpenFlow only mandates the fields on the
packets that one can match upon, but not the actions to
be performed after the match, makes it hardly scalable and
ambiguous [4].
Programmable dataplanes and P4 [6] promise to fill this
gap by offering an open, flexible and silicon-independent
API, reconfigurability (the way switches process packets can
be changed at runtime), protocol independence (switches
are no longer tied to a specific network protocol), and tar-
get independence (packet processing functionality can be
programmed independently of the specifics of the underly-
ing hardware). Besides a high-level programming language
Figure 1: OpenFlow vs P4 attack surface
which can be compiled against many different types of execu-
tion machines (called “P4 targets”, which have a P4 compiler
back-end), P4 offers a common API (called the P4 Runtime
API ), and allows to change and immediately start using new
forwarding tables, without restarting the API or the control
plane. The P4 language has no support for specific protocols,
rather, the P4 programs are responsible for specifying how
a switch processes packets. These programs are then inter-
preted and processed by the compiled program on the target
device.
Our paper is motivated by the observation that pro-
grammable dataplanes and P4 do not only enable more flexi-
ble communication networks, interesting new use cases, and
an unprecedented performance, but also introduce a new at-
tack surface and hence have implications on security. Indeed,
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Figure 2: Overview of P4 components, assets and at-
tack points in ONOS Controller
while the security of SDN architectures in general and Open-
Flow in particular have been explored in different studies in
the past, little is known about the security implications of
emerging P4 platforms.
Our Contributions. This paper observes that pro-
grammable dataplanes and P4 change the security landscape,
which so far is to a large extent uncharted. Accordingly,
we present a first systematic breakdown and approach to
study the attack surface and security implications of emerg-
ing network architectures supporting programmable packet
forwarding. Based on this breakdown, we characterize the
possible attack surface of a P4-based SDN environment, high-
lighting possible attacks and vulnerabilities related to the P4
language and compiler, the controller (exemplified by ONOS),
the P4 Runtime, as well as the switches (exemplified by the
BMv2 switch). Based on these insights, we discuss how spe-
cific attacks and countermeasures can be implemented and
report on some experiments. See Figure 1 for an overview of
the attack surface and comparison to traditional OpenFlow.
2 SECURITY CHALLENGES
In this section we provide a brief overview of the main assets
of a (typical) P4 SDN environment and a STRIDE analysis of
the attack surface presented by such an environment.
2.1 P4 Assets
To perform our security and vulnerability analysis of P4, we
first have to identify and prioritise the potential targets, i.e.,
the assets of the P4 platform. An asset in this context is any
Figure 3: Overview of P4 components, assets and at-
tack points in BMv2 Switch
data, device, or other component that supports information
related P4 activities. For convenience we have grouped the
P4 assets of interest into four general categories: control
plane assets, channel plane assets, dataplane assets, and the
P4 compiler, see Figure 2 and Figure 3 for an overview. In
the following we briefly describe the categories and their
concomitant assets.
Control Plane. The control plane, as a whole, is concerned
with the routing process, including ongoing management
and setup of the process.
Applications. These are the primary assets in the control
plane. An application is (potentially third-party) software
designed to manage and perform specific actions within an
SDN.
P4Info. This is the result of compiling the P4 program.
This asset contains critical information such as tables, meters,
counter, etc. as well as assigned IDs, enabling communication
between controller and switch. This information is also used
by both the P4 controller to setup the forwarding configura-
tion and the P4 runtime (denoted P4Runtime in Figure 2) for
translating IDs into objects.
P4DeviceConfig. The result of compiling the P4 control
program to the target switch using the appropriate back-end
compiler, e.g., bmv2JSON is the output of bmv2 back-end
compiler. This asset is used by the controller, together with
the P4Info, to set up the forwarding plane configuration.
SwitchPipeConf. This is a controller application that
defines the switch pipeline by using the P4Info and
P4DeviceConfig assets to set up a mapping between P4 and
platform specific objects.
Switch driver. The switch driver is a switch-specific ap-
plication running on the controller and typically developed
by the switch vendor. It provides an interface for adding
and removing target specific table entries using the mapping
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set up by SwitchPipeConf. As an example, in ONOS, it maps
ONOS flows to P4 table entries.
P4Runtime agent. This is an application on the con-
troller that serializes the P4 objects and the forwarding con-
figuration to Protobuf and calls the intended RPC methods.
P4Runtime.proto. The P4Runtime protocol specification.
It defines the RPC methods and messages that can be used
between controller and switch. The protocol provides dif-
ferent RPC methods such as SetForwardingPipelingConfig
and StreamChanel. On top of these, the protocol provides a
multitude of message types. The P4Runtime.proto is present
in both controller and switch.
gRPC. The Remote Procedure Call (RPC) system devel-
oped at Google. It uses HTTP/2 for transport, Protocol Buffers
as the interface description language, and provides features
such as authentication, bidirectional streaming and flow con-
trol, cancellation and timeouts etc.
From the above, it should be clear that the control plane
contains a wide variety of assets, ranging from applications
to simple files, resulting in a wide attack surface.
Channel Plane. The channel plane is concerned with inter-
component communication (through channels), mainly be-
tween controller and switch. For our use, this plane com-
prises only a single asset:
Protobuf messages. These are the messages exchanged
between the controller and switch, serialized using Protocol
Buffers.
Dataplane. The dataplane is concerned with the actual for-
warding of data (packets) and shares (some) asset types with
the control plane.
gRPC. This is similar to the gRPC asset on the controller,
with the difference that if the switch gRPC is not available it
is only the switch that cannot be controlled anymore, while
if the controller gRPC is not available, the whole network
becomes uncontrollable.
P4Runtime.proto. The P4Runtime protocol specification
that defines the RPC methods and messages that can be used
between controller and switch. Similar to the file present on
the controller.
Parser/de-parser. These are defined in the P4 program
as a deterministic finite automaton (DFA) using states and
transitions.
Flow tables. These are the tables used to define exactly
how the packets are forwarded and processed.
Compiler. The compiler is a key asset on the P4 platform:
this is what enables the rapid development of applications
that can change major aspects of a network. However, as
with all programming, this also comes with many potential
risks requiring good (security aware) programming practices.
For our purposes, we consider different parts of the compiler
as separate assets.
Front-end compiler. This is a target-independent and
standard part of the compiler that deals with the seman-
tics checks, and that can be combined with a target-specific
back-end to create a complete P4 compiler. We here take the
front-end compiler to include various optimization passes,
performed before the generated Intermediate Representation
(IR) is sent to the back-end compiler.
Converter (P4-14 to P4-16). This part of the compiler
enables backward compatibility with the P4-14 version of the
P4 language. It parses the P4-14 into version 1 of the Inter-
mediate Language before it is converted to the Intermediate
Representation accepted by the back-end.
Back-end compiler. This is the main target-specific com-
ponent of the compiler, usually developed by the vendor of
the network components.
With this we conclude the survery of the P4 assets we
have identified. It is possible to identify even more specific
assets, but for an initial mapping of major (potential) security
vulnerabilities, we have found that the above lists provide a
good starting point.
2.2 STRIDE Analysis and Attack Surface
We now present a STRIDE analysis of the P4 platform, based
on the assets identified in the previous section. STRIDE [7] is
a well-known model for categorising (potential) IT-security
threats and a useful tool for structuring threat-analysis of IT
systems. The name is a mnemonic derived from the threat
categories comprising the model: Spoofing, Tampering, Repu-
diation, Information disclosure, Denial-of-service, and Evela-
tion of privilege. The threat categories cover most, if not all,
the “classic” threats/attacks that have been oberseved and
reported in the literature.
Since STRIDE analysis is fairly standard and well-known,
we will not discuss it in further detail here. We illustrate the
general methodology by briefly discussing an excerpt of the
STRIDE analysis for the P4Runtime component (see Table 1
for an overview).
Spoofing. A potential spoofing attack would be an at-
tacker (successfully) masquerading as a (different) switch in
the network. This would allow the attacker to elicit infor-
mation from the controller, such as de-/parser configuration,
pipeline configuration, forwarding table entries, and how
table-miss flows are handled.
Tampering. If an attacker can modify, i.e., tamper with,
protobuf messages can violate both confidentialiy, integrity,
and availability properties of the network. An attacker that
can take control of the switch gRPC or the controller gRPC,
can modify the sent and received protobuf messages, thus
controlling the switch or the entire network.
Repudiation. In a repudiation attack, an attacker can
make the switch refuse configurations from controller and
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Table 1: STRIDE analysis
Threat Propertyviolated Definition Example
Spoofing Authentication Impersonating somethingor someone else
Pretends to be another switch
in the network
Pretends to be the controller
Pretends to be the network
controller administrator
Tampering Integrity Modifying data or code
Intercept and modify
protobuf messages
Take control of gRPC server
and modify the protobuf
messages
Repudiation Non-repudiation Claiming to have notperformed an action
A switch that does not follow
the controller instructions
A controller claiming that
a switch has not connected to it
Information
Disclosure Confidentiality
Exposing information to
someone not authorized
to see it
Read device tables:
controller flows,
switch tables
Read protobuf messages
Denial of
Service Availability
Deny or degrade
service to users
Crashing the P4Runtime
gRPC service
Flooding the switch-
controller channel
Modify and invalidate
protobuf messages
Intercept and deny arrival
of the packets to the intended
device
Elevation
of
privilege
Authorization Gain capabilities withoutproper authorization
A switch changing
information in the controller
Configure a switch and
decide how the traffic is handled
claim they were not received, thus making the switch un-
controllable. An attacker can make the controller refuse con-
nections from switches that try to connect to it and claim
that no connection were instantiated, rendering the switch
unable to handle traffic.
Information disclosure.An attacker with a presence on
the network may be able to pick up information that is either
sent in the clear, such as unencrypted protobuf messages,
messages picked up directly from the control plane, or even
exploiting specific timing properties for an advanced timing-
attack on the controller or the switches.
Denial-of-service. A denial-of-service attack may crash
the gRPC service, making the communication between the
switch and the controller unavailable, potentially wrecking
havoc in the network.
Elevation of privilege. As part of an elevation of privi-
lege, an attacker can write malicious applications, and based
on the controller configuration, allow it to read, modify or
deny data and services. It may also modify the forwarding
tables.
To obtain a high-level overview of a system’s security
stance, it is often useful to consider the system’s attack sur-
face. In general, the attack surface of a system is the sum of
the different points (“attack vectors”) where an unauthorized
user (“attacker”) can try to enter data to or extract data from
an environment [5]. Here, the attack surface is composed of:
(1) the data in the system and messages exchanged, (2) the
methods for processing applications, e.g., request/response
methods, (3) the communication channels, e.g., HTTP, TCP.
3 P4 LANGUAGE AND COMPILER
The main components of the P4 language compiler are the
parser (either P4-14 or P4-16), an IR converter that enables
backwards compatibility with the P4-14 language, a fixed
front-end component, customizable mid-ends, and back-ends
provided by the vendor for specific targets. Since the front-
end and mid-end are standard and mostly fixed, bugs and/or
vulnerabilities at this level can generate incorrect IR for all
back-ends that are using them. Even though an attacker may
not be able to directly modify the P4 programs, the source
code of the front-end compiler and the language specifica-
tions can be found on the official websites and repositories.
P4 compiler fuzzer. One option the attacker has is to
write P4 programs that can either crash the compiler, gener-
ate invalid target code or target code that is not following
the original intentions. In order to automatically generate
random test-cases, a compiler fuzzer [8] can be implemented.
Race conditions. Another interesting and novel attack
may involve the use of concurrency, i.e., an attackermay try to
find out whether the race conditions are handled correctly. In
fact, the extern blocks instantiated by a P4 program are global,
and shared across all threads; if extern blocks mediate access
to state (e.g., counters, registers) [. . .] these stateful operations
are subject to data races. [1]. There are tools for the automatic
detection of race conditions, such as RaceMob, RaceFuzzer
and RaceChecker, however, currently none exist for P4.
P4-14 to P4-16 converter. Because of its backward com-
patibility with P4-14, the P4C introduces another point of
attack in the sense of the P4-14 to P4-16 converter. Bugs or
vulnerabilities in the converter can introduce another class
of problems related to the P4-14 version of P4 programs. Us-
ing a compiler fuzzer to generate P4-14 programs can be one
way to find bugs in the converter. Other vulnerabilities can
be related to the converter parallel actions. An example of
such a bug has been reported to the official repository (Issue
246) and it is still not clear if it was solved due to the P4 1.1
language specification being ambiguous.
P4 language benchmark. As presented earlier the back-
end compiler is target specific, therefore multiple compil-
ers are being developed without a clearly defined standard.
While the benchmark proposition could help creating a stan-
dard for the P4 compilers, it should be built and adopted by
the whole community, which e.g., is not the case of Whip-
persnapper [2], or at least not yet. Currently four sample
backends are available on the P4Lang repository: p4c-bm2-ss,
p4c-ebpf, p4test and p4c-graphs; the latter two are used for
debugging and generating graphs of top-level control flows.
Undefined behaviour. One possible attacking point is
represented by the P4 language specifications, more precisely
the “Undefined behavior” chapter. As stated in this chapter
“there are a few places where evaluating a P4 program can
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result in undefined behaviors: out parameters, uninitialized
variables, accessing header fields of invalid headers, and
accessing header stacks with an out of bounds index”. An
attacker can find code patterns that have a vulnerability
potential by making use of the undefined behavior. In this
sense, the new programmable switches have exploitability
potential if the undefined behaviour is handled differently
by some compilers compared to others.
ASSERT-P4. Assertion-based verification [3] can be used
to check general security and correctness properties of P4
programs. From an attacker point of view, the tool can also
be used to find vulnerabilities in open-source P4 applications.
ASSERT-P4 is a tool designed in this sense that can be used
to annotate the P4 programs with assertions, translate it to
a C-based model and verify it using a symbolic execution
engine. The engine tests all possible paths and reports any
assertion failure.
Table 2 and Table 3 summarizes the attacks and counter-
measures regarding the P4 language and compiler.
4 CASE STUDY: ONOS AND BMV2
To illustrate our general security analysis and make it more
concrete, we here consider three specific examples from the
ONOS project, namely the ONOS controller, the ONOS P4
Runtime, and the BMv2 Switch.
4.1 The ONOS Controller
Analysing the ONOS controller is particularly interesting,
as it is currently also modified to support P4. The ONOS
controller runs on top of a Java Virtual Machine and is mainly
used to alter the tables entries on the controlled devices in
the network in order to properly manage the network during
its operation.
Malicious applications.Malicious applications can dis-
close confidential information, slow down the service or even
crash the controller. ONOS runs as a single process including
all its internal components and also the installed and active
applications. Consequently, an attacker can crash the con-
troller by simply closing that process, which would not only
close the application but the entire ONOS controller.
Controller configuration. Another type of attack could
exploit the fact that networks are changing continuously,
with devices being removed, added, or crash. The controller
has to be configured properly and have the right applications
running in order to support such churn. The complexity of
the required configurations (related to encryption, usage of
strong credentials, only activating the features that are re-
quired for the specific network, and so on) may introduce
errors and increase the attack surface. One example of such
a configuration is that ONOS Command Line Interface (CLI)
has a default insecure client (Apache Karaf) since it relies on
a well-known private key. Installing the security countermea-
sure (onos-secure-ssh) as described in the documentation is
not working due to it being outdated. The fact that some ver-
sions of ONOS have the Security-mode disabled by default,
and enabling it can be a tedious process, contributes also to
the overall security.
Authentication.Access to the CLI,Web GUI, or the REST
API is done through authentication. While the ONOS CLI
uses public/private key authentication, the GUI and the REST
API require username/password credentials. The brute-force
type of attacks exploit the fact that users often use simple
enough combinations of username and password.
Table 2 and Table 3 summarizes the attacks and counter-
measures regarding the controller.
4.2 The P4 Runtime
We identify two main vulnerabilities which regard the P4
Runtime (both the Java ONOS controller and the C++ BMv2
switch): a man-in-the-middle attack and channel flooding.
Man-in-the-middle. A man-in-the-middle attack re-
quires that the adversary has access to the channel through
which important packets travel. This type of attack is partic-
ularly relevant in the context of P4 programmable switches
with P4Runtime support because the gRPC messages com-
municated on the channel between the switch and the con-
troller, containing much sensitive information: e.g., switch
configuration files, the tables available, and other control
messages altering the table entries. The information cap-
tured by the adversary can be used for other types of attacks
such as spoofing. Also worth mentioning is the fact that if
the switch sends the packets that do not match any tables
to the controller, the adversary is also able to capture these
messages which could contain sensitive information such as
credentials or other personal information. Even though the
messages are serialized into binaries using protobuf, they are
not encrypted and can be deserialized by using the protobuf
compiler. The deserialization process requires the P4Runtime
protocol specification for protobuf and the P4 program in-
formation file containing the IDs for tables and other P4
objects. The P4Runtime protocol specification can be easily
obtained since it is publicly available while the P4Info file
can be obtained by listening for the initial start-up process of
the switch when this file is transmitted from the controller
to the switch.
Channel flooding. In the context of P4 programmable
switches controlled using the P4Runtime protocol there is a
single P4Runtime agent in the controller while each switch
has its own P4Runtime agent. Thus flooding the channel
with packets from one or multiple switches in the network
can lead to slower response time or even denial of service
of the P4Runtime agent in the controller. The attack can be
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Table 2: Attacks
Legend:#= Low,G#= Medium, = High
Name Component Impact Difficulty
Exploiting Undefined
Behaviour Compiler G# G#
Exploiting Concurrency Compiler G# G#
Assertion based
verification Compiler G#  
Malicious application Controller  G#
Exploiting
misconfiguration Controller  G#
Login brute-force Controller  G#
Man-in-the-Middle P4 Runtime  G#
Channel flooding P4 Runtime  G#
Spoofing the controller Switch   
conducted in both directions: e.g., the controller, probably
through a rogue application, may flood the switches with
many control messages in order to affect the behavior and
response time of the network.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the attacks and countermeasures
regarding the P4 runtime.
4.3 The BMv2 Switch
There are also potential vulnerabilities on the switch side.
For example, the BMv2 Switch with P4Runtime support has
its tables populated and altered by the controller through
remote procedure calls with messages serialized using the
protobuf protocol. This fact can be exploited by an adversary
by sending control messages to the switch as if these mes-
sages originate from the controller. In order for the adversary
to be able to perform such an attack, it needs to be able to
serialize messages using the protobuf protocol for sending
the information wanted to the switch. For serializing the
data the attacker needs to posses some knowledge regarding
the switch such as the description of the tables together with
their assigned ids which are contained in the P4Info file as
well as the switch behavior description which is located in
the compiled BMv2 JSON config file. The attacker can obtain
this information by using other attacks such as the man-in-
the-middle attack. By spoofing the controller, an attacker
can alter the table entries in the switches completely chang-
ing the behavior of the devices. This can be used to bypass
firewalls or change the configuration of the devices in a such
a way that would somehow benefit the adversary. Table 2
and Table 3 summarizes the attacks and countermeasures
regarding the switch.
Table 3: Countermeasures
Legend:#= Low,G#= Medium, = High
Name Component Impact Difficulty
Assertion based
verification Compiler G#  
Compiler fuzzer Compiler   
Whippersnapper
benchmark Compiler # G#
ONOS secure mode Controller  #
Symbolic Execution
Analysis Controller G#  
Brute-foce protection Controller G# #
Securing the channel P4 Runtime  #
Reactive firewall application P4 Runtime  G#
5 CONCLUSION
One may argue that at least the security of SDNs and Open-
Flow is fairly well-understood today, and indeed, many exist-
ing known weaknesses and vulnerabilities, as well as coun-
termeasures known from SDN architectures in general also
directly apply to P4. Yet, in this paper we have shown that
P4 architectures in general and programmable dataplanes in
particular come with many specific properties that have the
potential to change the security landscape and, as we argue,
require special attention.
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